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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Pro se appellant Joseph A. Cunningham, Jr., proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 
appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his claims after screening his complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
In 2018, Cunningham filed a complaint in the District Court alleging claims 
stemming from a foreclosure action.  Cunningham’s deceased father had owned the 
property at issue, and Cunningham is the executor of his father’s estate.  After lengthy 
legal proceedings in state court, the property appears to have been sold at a sheriff’s sale 
in November 2019, but the sale has not yet been confirmed.  Cunningham’s vague, 
rambling complaint appeared to allege that his rights were violated because documents 
were somehow illegally amended during the foreclosure proceedings and because his 
father was never served with process “due to his death.”  Compl. at p. 6. 
After granting Cunningham’s application to proceed IFP, the District Court 
screened his complaint and dismissed it.  The District Court determined that because 
Cunningham had repeatedly and unsuccessfully brought similar claims regarding the 
foreclosure action in prior cases before the District Court and this Court, his complaint 
should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as malicious.1  See Cunningham v. 
 
1  The District Court also concluded that abstention was appropriate pursuant to the 




Mortg. Contracting Servs. LLC, 634 F. App’x 361 (3d Cir. 2016); Cunningham v. JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, 537 F. App’x 44 (3d Cir. 2013).  The District Court determined that 
amendment would be futile.  Cunningham timely appealed.2 
“A court that considers whether an action is malicious must . . . engage in a 
subjective inquiry into the litigant’s motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit to 
determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or harass the defendant.”  
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995).  The District Court did not 
err in dismissing Cunningham’s complaint as malicious because Cunningham’s vague 
allegations, to the extent that they can be deciphered, essentially duplicate his numerous 
prior lawsuits about events that occurred years ago in this same foreclosure action.3  See 
Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993).  Under these circumstances, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it would be futile to grant 
Cunningham leave to amend his complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
not err in dismissing Cunningham’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), we need not 
address the District Court’s alternative ground for dismissal. 
2  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In Deutsch v. 
United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995), decided before a major revision of 
§ 1915 in 1996, we held that significant deference should be given to a district court’s 
order dismissing a complaint as malicious.  Even if the statutory revision suggests that we 
should review the determination de novo, see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 
604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 
(2007), we would still agree with the District Court’s conclusion. 
 




Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 
